

Convention

In order to differentiate them from their familiar English counterparts, the terms defined in the model all begin with an underscore -hence ‘_sentence’, ‘_agent’, etc..

The base model

The first iteration of the model consists of

- A large set of sentence-like strings of sounds, *_sentences*, $\{s_1, \dots, s_k\}$.
- A large set of speakers or *_agents*, $\{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$.
- For each *_agent* a_i , a *_value* function,

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x} \rightarrow v \quad \text{(first pass)}$$

where s is a *_sentence*, t is a time, \mathbf{x} is a point in 3-dimensional space representing a_i 's position, and v is a number between 0 and 1. 0 represents maximum dis-value, 1 maximum value, and 0.5 indifference. A *_sentence* token is a complex of the form $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x} \rangle$; a *_sentence* type is just s .

Comment

_Sentences are meant to be apparently semantically inert. They're just sequences of sounds. *_Value* is the model's counterpart to the feeling associated with a real-world sentence when what it says is the case, even if trivial or banal. It correlates to degree of belief or confidence familiar from decision theory. Intrinsically, though, it is just a feeling.

Pleasure

The model is augmented to include

- A model-specific pleasure, *_pleasure*, which is experienced when some token *_sentences* are encountered (novel *_propositions*, defined below). The character of *_pleasure* is the same for all *_sentences*.

Comment

_Pleasure, unlike *_value*, is meant to be some nice feeling distinct from any familiar feeling. It is meant to correlate to the real-world benefits truth facilitates getting, including avoiding familiar pains. It serves in the model as the only motive for exchanging *_sentences* – for ‘_conversing’. The sole goal of talk in the model is to maximize *_pleasure*. It is a lesson of the model that this one-dimensional *_pleasure*, in contrast to life's many pleasures and pains-avoided, is sufficient for semantics.

The model, first refinement – focus of attention

To reflect the fact that our reaction to a sentence may depend on where we are looking, what we may be touching, etc., a second 3-dimensional position argument, ξ , is added to represent agent a_i 's focus of attention:

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rightarrow v. \quad \text{(second pass)}$$

A $_sentence$ token now is a complex of the form $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$.

Comment

There are differences between $_sentence$ tokens and sentence tokens as sometimes understood. Notably, one utterance of a $_sentence$ by an $_agent$ may correspond to many tokens heard by other $_agents$.

$_Belief$

An $_agent$ a_i *believes* a token $_sentence$ $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$ iff a_i heard or has entertained $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$ and $V_i(s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi) > 0.5$. $_Agent$ a_i *disbelieves* s iff a_i heard or has entertained $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$ and $V_i(s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi) < 0.5$.

The model, second refinement – $_beliefs$

The next parameter to add is a set, B , of token $_sentences$ representing the token $_sentences$ believed by a_i :

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B \rightarrow v. \quad \text{(third pass)}$$

Comment

B makes the $_value$ function impredicative, as plausibly it should be. What is newly $_valued$ may depend on what is already $_valued$.

The B parameter is not a constituent of the token $_sentence$ $_valued$.

The definition just above of *believes* is updated to include the prior $_beliefs$ parameter. That is, an $_agent$ $_believes$ a $_sentence$ just in case

$$V_i(s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B) > 0.5$$

As refinements are made, associated definitions are henceforth implicitly updated.

The model, third refinement – utterer

The third parameter to add is an $_agent$, a_j , meant to be thought of as the $_agent$ who uttered the $_sentence$:

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B, a_j \rightarrow v \quad \text{(fourth pass)}$$

A *_sentence* token now is a complex of the form $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, a \rangle$.

Comment

It may be tempting to conceive of the *_value* function as a kind-of placeholder for the enormously complex algorithm which governs the processing of information and the generation of behaviour in a cognitive agent -an algorithm, success in the divining of whose details one might think is the measure of the cognitive scientist's or philosopher's worth. This emphatically is not its point. Its point is solely to schematize the resources needed to get semantics off the ground – what minimally is required to give rise in a system to concepts cognate to the concepts of truth, meaning, etc.. Its significance is that it shows that truth and meaning can be made sense of without a world of things to talk about.

One point of this is that although *_value* is specific to an *_agent*, it is not 'proximate': what matters is the variation of *_value* with utterer, not something in the nature of a 'perceived' utterer. The model can allow that, say, an *_agent* would highly *_value* a *_sentence* s uttered by a_1 only because -we can suppose- he 'mistakes' a_1 for a_2 and as a consequence -we want to say- misinterprets the *_sentence*. The means to distinguish mistakes as such does not need to be built into the *_value* function. All we need is that a_i at t and \mathbf{x} , focused on ξ and *_believing* the elements of B , *_values* s when it is uttered by a_1 .

The model, fourth and final refinement – *_context*

The fourth and final parameter to add is a set, C , of token *_sentences* representing the *_sentences* heard at recent times $t' < t$ by a_i at t , excluding s itself – the *_context* of s :

$$V_i : s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B, a_j, C \rightarrow v \quad \text{(final pass)}$$

A *_sentence* token now is a complex of the form $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, a, C \rangle$.

Comment

The elements of C are token *_sentences*, each with its own *_context*. But C may be empty, just as not all sentences require a context to be intelligible.

_Observation and *_theory *_sentences**

A token *_sentence* s is an *_observation *_sentence** for a_i iff the *_value* of s is independent of B and varies with $\langle t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$. A *theory *_sentence** for a_i is a token *_sentence* whose *_value* does vary with B .

Aggregate *_value*

The aggregate *_value* A_i of a set of token *_sentences* B for a_i is,

$$A_i(B) = \sum_{j=0}^n V_i(s_j, B \setminus \{s_j\})$$

where s_j are the elements of B .

Maximal $_belief$ set for a_i

B is a maximal $_belief$ set for $_agent$ a_i iff the aggregate $_value$ of B for a_i is greater than or equal to the aggregate $_value$ for a_i of any other set, B' .

Comment

This definition allows for a tie for first place. This is presumed to be highly improbable but possible. At stake here are questions about whether truth is absolute or relative, which the model does not adjudicate.

$_True$ for a_i

A token $_sentence$ s is $_true$ for a_i iff s is an element of a maximal $_belief$ set B for a_i and the aggregate of B would be lower if s were removed.

Joint aggregate $_value$

The combined or joint aggregate $_value$ for the $_speakers$ of a $_language$ of a set of $_sentences$ B is the sum of the aggregate values for all $_agents$ of B :

$$J(B) = \sum_{i=0}^n A_i(B)$$

where i ranges over all $_agents$ who speak the $_language$.

Maximal $_belief$ set

B is a maximal $_belief$ set iff the joint aggregate $_value$ of B is greater than or equal to the joint aggregate $_value$ of any other set, B' .

$_True$

A token $_sentence$ s is $_true$ iff s is an element of a maximal $_belief$ set B_T and the joint aggregate of B_T would be lower if s were removed.

$_Words$

The model is augmented to include

- A large set of word-like strings of sounds, $_words$, $\{w_1, \dots, w_m\}$.

$_sentences$ are now constrained always to be decomposable into sequences or ordered sets of $_words$.

Phrases

Any non-empty ordered set of words is a phrase.

Atomic sentence

A sentence s is atomic for the purposes of the model *iff* there is no phrase which is a proper part of s which is itself a sentence.

Sentential function

A sentential function is a construct got from an atomic sentence by replacing a phrase within it with a placeholder variable.

Moment

A moment is a complex of the form $\langle t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, C, a \rangle$.

Moment set of a phrase at a moment

A set M of sentential functions is the moment set at a moment m of a phrase p *iff* M is the set of all and only the sentential functions which upon completion with p at m would result in a true token sentence.

Comment

The thought, roughly, is that the moment set of a ‘subject’ phrase at a moment is the set of all ‘predicate’ phrases which when combined with it would make a true sentence; the moment set of a predicate phrase, the set of all subject phrases which would do likewise.

Tense-adjusted sentence

Call an ordinary sentence (of English, say) “tense-adjusted” *iff* it is expressed in the historical present tense with exact time and location prepended.

The model is now stipulated to include among its stock of words,

- sound-alike correlates of the words of English (say) used to express time and location in tense-adjusted sentences.

A token sentence is tense-adjusted *iff* it matches the grammatical form of an ordinary tense-adjusted sentence – that is, if it has prepended to it words corresponding to an ordinary, grammatically correct expression of time and location such as would appear in an ordinary tense-adjusted sentence.

Finally, a *set* of sentences is tense-adjusted *iff* it contains only tense-adjusted sentences.

Comment

Limiting attention to *_tense-adjusted _sentences* is a device to permit comparing *_sentences _true* at different *_moments*. To keep with the thought experiment, the required *_words* are just sequences of sounds.

Example

A *_tense-adjusted* correlate of the *_sentence*,

*s*₁: Fido was on the rug.

might be

*s*₂: Monday, May 1st, 2022 at noon, in the entrance at 999 Mongrel St. in Toronto, Fido is on the rug.

Sameness of *_meaning*

Token *_phrases* *p*₁ and *p*₂ have the *same _meaning* iff their *_tense-adjusted _moment* sets are the same.

Comment

Conversational context may seem to present a problem here. In familiar theories, something like a speaker's intentions fixes the meanings of token words and hence their truth. In the model, the concept of *_agents' _valuations* of token *_sentences* must do the corresponding work. For the model to be accurate, then, there must be an intuitive concept of valuing of token sentences which rejects as apparently false contextually inapposite token sentences which might otherwise appear true. An example may clarify the point:

Example

In a conversation among politically educated people also versed in mountaineering, the following sentences are uttered:

"Hillary was Secretary of State for Barack Obama."

"Hillary was a New York senator."

"Hillary ran for President against Trump."

In this conversation, someone now says,

"Hillary climbed Mount Everest."

The present point is that the model requires there to be in reality an intuitively clear, pre-theoretical notion of sentence-valuation according to which the last sentence is valued differently than the first three. I think there is, but make this explicit to acknowledge that the point requires further discussion. (Sentence valuation has to underwrite word disambiguation, not vice-versa).

Sameness of proposition

Token sentences s_1 and s_2 express the *same* proposition just in case their respective constituent phrases can be mapped in order one-to-one such that the two phrases of each mapped pair have the same meaning.

Example:

s_1 : Bob's dog is a mutt (spoken yesterday across town)

s_2 : Fido is a Heinz 57 (spoken today here)

These two token sentences express the same proposition just in case the contained tokens of

a) 'Fido' and 'Bob's dog' have the same meaning, and

b) 'is a mutt' and 'is a Heinz 57' have the same meaning (Note that the conversational context of s_2 would make typical tokens of, e.g., 'That bottle of sauce is a Heinz 57', in the moment, *false*. This is effectively the same point as made in the comment just above on sameness of meaning.).

Proposition

The proposition expressed by a token sentence s is the set of all and only the token sentences which express the same proposition as s .

Comment

Note that the propositional object of the belief of agent a_i is not a proposition (*simpliciter*) but rather a proposition-for- a_i . This and related concepts are not defined here - they are got by substituting 'token sentence valued by a_i ' for 'true token sentence' in the relevant definitions.