

## Convention

In order to differentiate them from their familiar English counterparts, the terms defined in the model all begin with an underscore -hence ‘\_sentence’, ‘\_agent’, etc..

## \_Proposition

The *\_proposition* expressed by a token *\_sentence* *s* is the set of all and only the *\_token \_sentences* which express the same *\_proposition* as *s*.

### *Comment*

Note that the *\_propositional* object of the *\_belief* of *\_agent*  $a_i$  is not a *\_proposition* (*simpliciter*) but rather a *\_proposition-for- $a_i$* . This and related concepts are not defined here - they are got by substituting ‘token *\_sentence* *\_valued* by  $a_i$ ’ for ‘*\_true token \_sentence*’ in the relevant definitions.

## Sameness of *\_proposition*

Token *\_sentences*  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  express the *same \_proposition* just in case their respective constituent *\_phrases* can be mapped in order one-to-one such that the two *\_phrases* of each mapped pair have the same *\_meaning*.

### *Example:*

$s_1$ : Bob’s dog is a mutt (spoken yesterday across town)

$s_2$ : Fido is a Heinz 57 (spoken today here)

These two token *\_sentences* express the same *\_proposition* just in case the contained tokens of

- a) ‘Fido’ and ‘Bob’s dog’ have the same *\_meaning*, and
- b) ‘is a mutt’ and ‘is a Heinz 57’ have the same *\_meaning* (Note that the conversational context of  $s_2$  would make typical tokens of, e.g., ‘That bottle of sauce is a Heinz 57’, in the moment, *false*. This is effectively the same point as made in the comment just below on sameness of meaning.).

## Sameness of *\_meaning*

Token *\_phrases*  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  have the *same \_meaning* iff their *\_tense-adjusted \_moment* sets are the same.

### *Comment*

Conversational context may seem to present a problem here. In familiar theories, something like a speaker’s intentions fixes the meanings of token words and hence their truth. In the model, the concept of *\_agents’ \_valuations* of token *\_sentences* must do the corresponding work. For the model to be accurate, then, there must be an intuitive concept of valuing of token sentences which rejects as apparently false contextually inapposite token sentences which might otherwise appear true. An example may clarify the point:

### *Example*

In a conversation among politically educated people also versed in mountaineering, the following sentences are uttered:

*“Hillary was Secretary of State for Barack Obama.”*

*“Hillary was a New York senator.”*

*“Hillary ran for President against Trump.”*

In this conversation, someone now says,

*“Hillary climbed Mount Everest.”*

The present point is that the model requires there to be in reality an intuitively clear, pre-theoretical notion of sentence-valuation according to which the last sentence is valued differently than the first three. I think there is, but make this explicit to acknowledge that the point requires further discussion. (Sentence valuation has to underwrite word disambiguation, not vice-versa).

### **Tense-adjusted \_sentence**

Call an ordinary sentence (of English, say) “tense-adjusted” *iff* it is expressed in the historical present tense with exact time and location prepended.

The model is now stipulated to include among its stock of \_words,

- sound-alike correlates of the words of English (say) used to express time and location in tense-adjusted sentences.

A token \_sentence is *\_tense-adjusted* *iff* it matches the grammatical form of an ordinary tense-adjusted sentence – that is, if it has prepended to it \_words corresponding to an ordinary, grammatically correct expression of time and location such as would appear in an ordinary tense-adjusted sentence.

Finally, a *set* of \_sentences is *\_tense-adjusted* *iff* it contains only *\_tense-adjusted* \_sentences.

### *Comment*

Limiting attention to *\_tense-adjusted* \_sentences is a device to permit comparing \_sentences *\_true* at different *\_moments*. To keep with the thought experiment, the required *\_words* are just sequences of sounds.

### *Example*

A *\_tense-adjusted* correlate of the *\_sentence*,

*s*<sub>1</sub>: Fido was on the rug.

might be

*s*<sub>2</sub>: Monday, May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022 at noon, in the entrance at 999 Mongrel St. in Toronto, Fido is on the rug.

## **Moment set of a phrase at a moment**

A set  $M$  of sentential functions is the moment set at a moment  $m$  of a phrase  $p$  iff  $M$  is the set of all and only the sentential functions which upon completion with  $p$  at  $m$  would result in a true token sentence.

*Comment*

The thought, roughly, is that the moment set of a 'subject' phrase at a moment is the set of all 'predicate' phrases which when combined with it would make a true sentence; the moment set of a predicate phrase, the set of all subject phrases which would do likewise.

## **Moment**

A moment is a complex of the form  $\langle t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, C, a \rangle$ .

## **Sentential function**

A sentential function is a construct got from an atomic sentence by replacing a phrase within it with a placeholder variable.

## **Atomic sentence**

A sentence  $s$  is atomic for the purposes of the model iff there is no phrase which is a proper part of  $s$  which is itself a sentence.

## **Phrases**

Any non-empty ordered set of words is a phrase.

## **Words**

The model is augmented to include

- A large set of word-like strings of sounds, words,  $\{w_1, \dots, w_m\}$ .

sentences are now constrained always to be decomposable into sequences or ordered sets of words.

## **True**

A token sentence  $s$  is true iff  $s$  is an element of a maximal belief set  $B_T$  and the joint aggregate of  $B_T$  would be lower if  $s$  were removed.

## Maximal belief set

$B$  is a maximal belief set iff the joint aggregate value of  $B$  is greater than or equal to the joint aggregate value of any other set,  $B'$ .

## Joint aggregate value

The combined or joint aggregate value for the speakers of a language of a set of sentences  $B$  is the sum of the aggregate values for all agents of  $B$ :

$$J(B) = \sum_{i=0}^n A_i(B)$$

where  $i$  ranges over all agents who speak the language.

## True for $a_i$

A token sentence  $s$  is true for  $a_i$  iff  $s$  is an element of a maximal belief set  $B$  for  $a_i$  and the aggregate of  $B$  would be lower if  $s$  were removed.

## Maximal belief set for $a_i$

$B$  is a maximal belief set for  $a_i$  iff the aggregate value of  $B$  for  $a_i$  is greater than or equal to the aggregate value for  $a_i$  of any other set,  $B'$ .

### *Comment*

This definition allows for a tie for first place. This is presumed to be highly improbable but possible. At stake here are questions about whether truth is absolute or relative, which the model does not adjudicate.

## Aggregate value

The aggregate value  $A_i$  of a set of token sentences  $B$  for  $a_i$  is,

$$A_i(B) = \sum_{j=0}^n V_i(s_j, B \setminus \{s_j\})$$

where  $s_j$  are the elements of  $B$ .

## Observation and theory sentences

A token sentence  $s$  is an observation sentence for  $a_i$  iff the value of  $s$  is independent of  $B$  and varies with  $\langle t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$ . A theory sentence for  $a_i$  is a token sentence whose value does vary with  $B$ .

## The model, fourth and final refinement – context

The fourth and final parameter to add is a set,  $C$ , of token sentences representing the sentences heard at recent times  $t' < t$  by  $a_i$  at  $t$ , excluding  $s$  itself – the context of  $s$ :

$$V_i : s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B, a_j, C \rightarrow v \quad (\text{final pass})$$

A sentence token now is a complex of the form  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, a, C \rangle$ .

### *Comment*

The elements of  $C$  are token sentences, each with its own context. But  $C$  may be empty, just as not all sentences require a context to be intelligible.

## The model, third refinement – utterer

The third parameter to add is an agent,  $a_j$ , meant to be thought of as the agent who uttered the sentence:

$$V_i : s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B, a_j \rightarrow v \quad (\text{fourth pass})$$

A sentence token now is a complex of the form  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, a \rangle$ .

### *Comment*

It may be tempting to conceive of the value function as a kind-of placeholder for the enormously complex algorithm which governs the processing of information and the generation of behaviour in a cognitive agent -an algorithm, success in the divining of whose details one might think is the measure of the cognitive scientist's or philosopher's worth. This emphatically is not its point. Its point is solely to schematize the resources needed to get semantics off the ground – what minimally is required to give rise in a system to concepts cognate to the concepts of truth, meaning, etc.. Its significance is that it shows that truth and meaning can be made sense of without a world of things to talk about.

One point of this is that although value is specific to an agent, it is not 'proximate': what matters is the variation of value with utterer, not something in the nature of a 'perceived' utterer. The model can allow that, say, an agent would highly value a sentence  $s$  uttered by  $a_1$  only because -we can suppose- he 'mistakes'  $a_1$  for  $a_2$  and as a consequence -we want to say- misinterprets the sentence. The means to distinguish mistakes as such does not need to be built into the value function. All we need is that  $a_i$  at  $t$  and  $\mathbf{x}$ , focused on  $\xi$  and believing the elements of  $B$ , values  $s$  when it is uttered by  $a_1$ .

## The model, second refinement – beliefs

The next parameter to add is a set,  $B$ , of token sentences representing the token sentences believed by  $a_i$ :

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B \rightarrow v.$$

(third pass)

### *Comment*

$B$  makes the  $v$  value function impredicative, as plausibly it should be. What is newly  $v$ -valued may depend on what is already  $v$ -valued.

The  $B$  parameter is not a constituent of the token  $v$ -sentence  $v$ -valued.

The definition just above of  $v$ -belief is updated to include the prior  $v$ -beliefs parameter. That is, an  $v$ -agent  $v$ -believes a  $v$ -sentence just in case

$$V_i(s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi, B) > 0.5$$

As refinements are made, associated definitions are henceforth implicitly updated.

## **$v$ -Belief**

An  $v$ -agent  $a_i$   $v$ -believes a token  $v$ -sentence  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$  iff  $a_i$  heard or has entertained  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$  and  $V_i(s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi) > 0.5$ .  $v$ -Agent  $a_i$   $v$ -disbelieves  $s$  iff  $a_i$  heard or has entertained  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$  and  $V_i(s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi) < 0.5$ .

## **The model, first refinement – focus of attention**

To reflect the fact that our reaction to a sentence may depend on where we are looking, what we may be touching, etc., a second 3-dimensional position argument,  $\xi$ , is added to represent agent  $a_i$ 's focus of attention:

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rightarrow v.$$

(second pass)

A  $v$ -sentence token now is a complex of the form  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x}, \xi \rangle$ .

### *Comment*

There are differences between  $v$ -sentence tokens and sentence tokens as sometimes understood. Notably, one utterance of a  $v$ -sentence by an  $v$ -agent may correspond to many tokens heard by other  $v$ -agents.

## **$v$ -Pleasure**

The model is augmented to include

- A model-specific pleasure,  $v$ -pleasure, which is experienced when some token  $v$ -sentences are encountered (novel  $v$ -propositions, defined below). The character of  $v$ -pleasure is the same for all  $v$ -sentences.

### *Comment*

\_Pleasure, unlike \_value, is meant to be some nice feeling distinct from any familiar feeling. It is meant to correlate to the real-world benefits truth facilitates getting, including avoiding familiar pains. It serves in the model as the only motive for exchanging \_sentences – for ‘\_conversing’. The sole goal of talk in the model is to maximize \_pleasure. It is a lesson of the model that this one-dimensional \_pleasure, in contrast to life’s many pleasures and pains-avoided, is sufficient for semantics.

## **The base model**

The first iteration of the model consists of

- A large set of sentence-like strings of sounds, \_sentences,  $\{s_1, \dots, s_k\}$ .
- A large set of speakers or \_agents,  $\{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$ .
- For each \_agent  $a_i$ , a \_value function,

$$V_i: s, t, \mathbf{x} \rightarrow v \quad \text{(first pass)}$$

where  $s$  is a \_sentence,  $t$  is a time,  $\mathbf{x}$  is a point in 3-dimensional space representing  $a_i$ ’s position, and  $v$  is a number between 0 and 1. 0 represents maximum dis-value, 1 maximum value, and 0.5 indifference. A \_sentence token is a complex of the form  $\langle s, t, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ ; a \_sentence type is just  $s$ .

### *Comment*

\_Sentences are meant to be apparently semantically inert. They’re just sequences of sounds. \_Value is the model’s counterpart to the feeling associated with a real-world sentence when what it says is the case, even if trivial or banal. It correlates to degree of belief or confidence familiar from decision theory. Intrinsically, though, it is just a feeling.